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The knowledge-centric Theory of Mind research program suggested by Phillips et al. stands 
to gain significant value by embracing a neurocognitive approach that takes full advantage of 
techniques like fMRI and EEG. This neurocognitive approach has already begun providing 
important insights into the mechanisms of knowledge attribution, insights which support the 




The knowledge-centric approach advocated by Phillips et al. represents a welcome 
advancement in Theory of Mind research, and I am in complete agreement with this proposed 
shift in focus. My concern, however, is that Phillips et al. have overlooked an important 
source of evidence available to this emerging project—the neuroscience of knowledge 
attribution. Capable of providing insights even when undetectable in behavioral measures, as 
well as independent lines of converging evidence, hemodynamic (e.g. fMRI and fNIRS) and 
neurophysiological techniques (e.g. EEG and MEG) serve as powerful tools in Theory of 
Mind research. Crucially, neuroimaging has already begun to provide direct support for 
Phillips et al.’s central claim that knowledge attribution is more basic than belief 
attribution—belief attribution seems to demand neural resources that knowledge attribution 
does not (Bricker 2020). All this gives us compelling reason to think that the neuroscience of 
knowledge attribution has a vital role to play in the nascent knowledge-centric Theory of 
Mind research program. 
 
It is not without good reason that neuroimaging techniques have been widely employed in the 
effort to understand our Theory of Mind systems (for overviews, see Carrington & Bailey 
2009; Mahy et al. 2014; Schurz et al. 2014; Heleven & Van Overwalle 2018). A considerable 
amount of evidence indicates that the cognitive processes supporting human Theory of Mind 
capacities are both associated with identifiable neural correlates (see Heleven & Van 
Overwalle 2018) and distinct from more generalized executive function in the brain (see e.g. 
Hartwright et al. 2015; Samson et al. 2015; Bradford et al. 2020; Pacella et al. 2020). If the 
knowledge-centric Theory of Mind program is to achieve success comparable to that of its 
belief-centric counterpart, this observation is key. Mental state attributions are best 
understood not as cognitive, but rather neurocognitive processes. 
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The identifiable neural correlates of Theory of Mind processing enable neuroimaging 
techniques to provide additional lines of evidence that can converge with the findings of other 
methods. For example, fMRI studies indicating that the perspective taking and self-
perspective inhibition components of Theory of Mind are largely supported by distinct 
regions in the brain (e.g. van Der Meer et al. 2011; Schuwerk et al. 2014; Hartwright et al. 
2015; Özdem et al. 2019) have offered considerable support to the claim that these are indeed 
separate neurocognitive processes, which was initially suggested by Samson et al. primarily 
on the basis of lesion studies (2005).  
 
Moreover, neuroimaging methods are especially valuable in their capacity to provide insights 
into Theory of Mind processing even when those insights aren’t salient on behavioral 
measures. To take an example from fMRI, Hartwright et al. found differences in 
hemodynamic activity indicating that self-perspective inhibition during mental state 
attribution is distinct from inhibition during non-mental tasks, a finding that was not 
detectable in their behavioral data (2015). Taking a similar example from EEG, an N400 
paradigm employed by Bradford et al. revealed initial egocentric processing during the 
attribution of false beliefs—even when those attributions were ultimately computed 
successfully (i.e. altercentrically)—providing key evidence that “egocentric processing is the 
default perspective for information integration” in such cases (2020, 276). Again, this 
evidence was not salient in their behavioral data  
 
All this provides a general sense of the value of neuroimaging in Theory of Mind research. 
However, the neurocognitive findings most directly pertinent to the research program 
imagined by Phillips et al. come from my own EEG study (Bricker 2020). The first step in a 
broader research project dedicated to understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms of 
knowledge attribution, the design of this study was simple, with participants varyingly 
judging whether a cartoon character sitting at a table knew/believed that there were two 
cylinders on the table. This study provided two key results: (1) There were no significant 
difference in response time between belief attribution and knowledge attribution. (2) 
Differences in P3b amplitude indicated that the belief attribution tasks demanded a level of 
neural resources significantly greater than that of the knowledge attribution tasks, which is 
most likely explained by a greater demand for self-perspective inhibition during belief vs. 
knowledge attribution. 
 
These findings are relevant to the account presented in the target article for at least two 
distinct reasons. First, these results provide additional evidence for the target article’s central 
claim that knowledge attribution is at least as basic as belief attribution. As with the response 
time evidence discussed by Phillips et al. (§5.1), the idea that knowledge attribution relies on 
something like a belief attribution stage is inconsistent with the observation of comparable 
response times for belief and knowledge attribution tasks. We see something similar with the 
neurophysiological results, which indicate that belief attribution can entail processing 
demands that exceed those of knowledge attribution. This again suggests that knowledge 
attribution is the more basic of the two processes. 
 
However, beyond simply providing further evidence that belief attribution does not come 
before knowledge attribution, the results of this study also illustrate why knowledge-centric 
Theory of Mind research works best when understood as a neurocognitive endeavor, 
highlighting both the advantages of neurocognitive techniques outlined above. Not only did 
the neurophysiological results of the study provide an additional line of evidence for the 
conclusion suggested by behavioral measures, but these findings offered a further insight not 
salient on behavioral measures—Belief attribution appears to be a more resource-intensive 
process than knowledge attribution, likely due to differential demands for self-perspective 
inhibition. 
 
While it is too early to speculate whether this knowledge-focused Theory of Mind research 
will ultimately attract the same amount of attention as its belief-centric counterpart, it is clear 
that neurocognitive techniques have a good deal to offer this emerging project. Through the 
integration of behavioral and neuroimaging methods with the characterization of knowledge 
states offered by epistemologists (see especially §2 of the target article; Bricker 2020, §1.1), 
we stand to make significant strides towards understanding the mechanisms underlying our 
judgements about knowledge, which are at present still largely unknown. 
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